Cybersecurity & data protectionUpdated 22 min read
Real estate wire fraud happens when a criminal sends fake wire instructions that look like they come from the title company. Warn each client early, and do not send wire instructions yourself.
Tell the client to call a known number before money moves. If a wire goes wrong, call the sending bank first.

In real estate wire fraud, a criminal tells your client to send closing money to the wrong account. The client does.
It works because it hits at the worst time. The client is excited, tired and ready to send the largest sum of their life.
You are often the person that the client trusts most. In surveys, criminals most often pretend to be the agent.
This guide covers the seven ways that criminals reach a closing wire. For each one, it gives the measures that stop it and what to tell your clients.
Do these on each deal. They stop most attacks.
Take the phone number from the signed contract on the first day. Never take it from an email.
A call to this number takes less than a minute. It ends most wire scams.
Send the warning at the contract and again 2 days before closing. Cover each wire in the deal.
Many clients first hear about wire fraud from their agent. Your warning is often the only one.
Tell clients to use the secure portal of the title company or to call it. If you pass instructions on, you become the channel for a fake.
In the best-known agent liability case, the agent was the middleman for the instructions.
A change to bank details is a warning sign, even a small change. Treat it as fraud until a phone call proves it is not.
Use a number that you already had.
Criminals use a lookalike domain, an extra hyphen or a different Reply-To address. Compare the address with the contract.
Do not trust the display name.
A different account name is a stop sign. A bank may also flag it.
Ask the client to read the account name aloud on the call.
Use a passkey or an authenticator app, and check for hidden forwarding rules each month. Many wire scams start in the mailbox of an agent, a title company or a lender.
Our cybersecurity guide has the full steps.
Call your bank first. Then call the title company, and then file at IC3.gov.
Save the bank fraud line in your phone now.
A scam usually runs in five stages. A criminal gets into an account, watches the deal, sends new details, collects the money and moves it.
You can stop the scam at each stage. The earlier you stop it, the cheaper it is.
These are the seven paths into a closing wire.
A criminal gets into the email of the agent, the title company, the lender or the client. The criminal reads the thread and waits for a wire.
In a 2024 Alabama case, criminals sent phishing emails to title companies, real estate agents and real estate attorneys. When an employee entered a login, the criminals read the mailbox and watched for a buyer payment.
A criminal sends from an address that looks like the real one. The address can have an extra word, a hyphen or a swapped letter.
The criminal can also set a different Reply-To address. Your answer then goes to the criminal.
In a 2024 Texas case, the criminal changed wire instructions and sent them again from spoofed addresses that looked like the original senders.
A criminal pretends to be the lender of the seller. The criminal sends a payoff letter with a different account.
In a 2025 Texas case, an escrow officer had a fake email address made that looked like the address of a real lienholder. She sent false payoff amounts, and a title company paid out more than $350,000.
The seller and the agent often do not see the payoff. This path can hit a deal without any mistake by the client.
A criminal calls or texts the client and pretends to be the agent, the title company or a loan officer. The criminal can use a cloned voice.
In a 2025 CertifID survey of about 1,500 buyers and sellers, victims named who the criminal pretended to be.
CertifID sells wire checks, so this is vendor data, not government data.
A criminal pretends to be the seller and asks the title company to send the sale money to a new account. The criminal can use a hijacked email or a fake seller.
The FBI says fake sellers often ask for proceeds to go to an attorney in a different state. Our guide to seller impersonation fraud covers the fake seller in full.
A criminal sends an invoice for an inspection, an appraisal or a survey with new bank details. A criminal with mailbox access can also ask the title company to send your commission to a new account.
We found no published numbers for these paths. The pattern is the same as for other paths.
Most wire fraud comes from outside. Sometimes a person who works at a closing firm takes the funds.
In a 2021 Virginia case, a settlement agent took $715,000 of closing funds in 48 transactions. She made seven unauthorized wires at the request of a person she met online, and all 48 closings were affected.
In the 2025 Texas case above, the escrow officer used her position of trust to run the scheme.
Most warnings cover only the closing wire of the buyer. A deal has more wires, and a criminal can attack each one.
Choose a stage to see the attack and the checks.
Where criminals attack in a transaction
Choose a stage. The numbers come from CertifID 2025 recovery cases. They show only cases that reached a recovery service.
Who sends the money
The buyer sends it to the title or escrow company after the contract.
What the criminal tries
Fake instructions arrive early in a new email thread. The client has never sent a wire and cannot compare.
Check, in this order
Checks are our judgment. The numbers come from CertifID 2025 recovery cases (vendor data)
In the CertifID data, the costliest cases were not the closing wire of the buyer. Payoffs and seller proceeds had higher median losses.
Median loss by type of closing wire fraud
Dollars. Cash to close was 30% of cases, payoff 20% and seller proceeds 12%.
| Fraud type | Median loss ($) |
|---|---|
| Cash to close | 239850 |
| Seller proceeds | 343497 |
| Mortgage payoff | 389125 |
Source: CertifID 2025 recovery cases (a vendor's case data, not government data or a random sample)
This closing email is not real. Clients send emails like it to their agent.
Tap each part that worries you. Then check your answers.
A correct detail does not make an email safe.
Find the fake wire instructions email
Your buyer sends you this email the day before closing. The buyer asks if it is correct. Tap each part that worries you. Then check your answers.
to me
Criminals who read the real thread get the tone, names and timing right. Do not judge an email by how it sounds.
Use one rule. A phone call to a known number checks each change of money instructions.
Tick what you already do on each deal. The chart shows the gaps.
Wire safety self-check
Aim for 100% in each section. Your ticks stay in this browser.
Where you stand, by section
| Section | done |
|---|---|
| Before the deal | 0 of 4 |
| During the deal | 0 of 4 |
| Day of the wire | 0 of 3 |
Warn each client in writing at the start of the transaction. Warn again before closing.
Many brokerages need a signed wire fraud disclosure. Use the wording of your brokerage if it has one.
Safety note before we start. Criminals send fake wire instructions that look like they come from your title company. Your title company will not change instructions by email. Before you send money, call the title company on the number from their website or your contract. Check the details aloud. If anyone sends new bank details, including me, call first. Do not send the wire before you call.
Send it at contract and again 2 days before closing. Keep a copy in the file.
Your email signature can say "Wire details never change by email. Always call the title company on the number in your contract before you send money."
Do not check the details yourself. Send this answer.
Thank you for asking. I cannot check bank details by email. Nobody can. Call the title company on the number in your contract, not the number in this email. Read the account details to them. Do not send money until they say the details are correct.
Send it when a client sends you anything about wire details.
Use a number from your contract or the website of the company. Never use a number from the email.
This is a check call. My client got wire instructions by email for the closing at 123 Maple. Please tell me the bank name, the account name and the last 4 digits of the account number. Did the instructions change after the contract?
Be friendly. Make the safe way the easy way.
If a wire went to the wrong account, act in this order. The FBI says time is critical.
You do not need all the facts to start. Collect the amount, the date and time, the receiving bank, the account name and number and each email in the thread.
You do not recover the money alone. Your bank, the receiving bank and the FBI each do a part.
Your job is to start the process fast and give each of them the full facts.
Recovery is not certain. These steps give you the best chance.
Business email compromise (BEC) is the second-costliest crime type in the FBI data. In 2025, the Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) got 24,768 BEC complaints.
The losses were $3,046,598,558. The average BEC loss was about $123,000.
Business email compromise losses reported to the FBI
Millions of dollars, all industries. Complaints rose from 21,442 to 24,768.
| Year | Losses ($M) |
|---|---|
| 2024 | 2770.2 |
| 2025 | 3046.6 |
Source: FBI IC3 2024 and 2025 Internet Crime Reports
IC3 also has a separate real estate fraud group. Wire theft at closing usually goes in the BEC total, so treat the real estate numbers as a minimum.
Average loss per real estate fraud complaint
Dollars per complaint. Each year's reported losses divided by its complaints.
| Year | Average loss ($) |
|---|---|
| 2020 | 15600 |
| 2021 | 30300 |
| 2022 | 33800 |
| 2023 | 15300 |
| 2024 | 18500 |
| 2025 | 22200 |
Source: FBI IC3 annual reports, 2022 to 2025, calculated
Clients age 60 and over filed 2,473 real estate fraud complaints in 2025, about 1 in 5. They lost $123.7 million, about 45% of the total.
Real estate fraud losses for clients age 60 and over
Millions of dollars. Losses rose 62% from 2024 to 2025.
| Year | Losses ($M) |
|---|---|
| 2023 | 65.6 |
| 2024 | 76.3 |
| 2025 | 123.7 |
Source: FBI IC3 2025 Internet Crime Report, three-year comparison
Warn these clients by phone or in person, and offer to join the call when they check the wire.
First-time clients also lose money more often. CertifID says they are about 3 times as likely to lose money as experienced clients, and this is vendor data.
The U.S. Treasury studied bank reports of real estate BEC. It found that most first transfers go to a U.S. bank.
A fast recall request can then reach the money. FinCEN also found that title and closing firms are common targets for impersonation.
These cases show how each path works in real deals. Sort by loss, or filter by path.
Real estate wire fraud cases from government and court sources
Filter by path. Sort by loss.
| Alabama conspiracy (2024) | Hijacked email thread | $19.6 million | 231 victims lost the whole transaction. The main defendant got 10 years. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Texas phishing and spoofing (2024) | Lookalike address | About $12 million | 316 months in prison and $3,386,908 in restitution. |
| McAllen escrow officer (2025) | Fake payoff letter | More than $350,000 | 24 months in prison and $350,000 in restitution. |
| Virginia settlement agent (2021) | Insider | $715,000 | 48 closings affected. 18 months in prison. |
| Buyers and a fake attorney email (2025) | Lookalike address | More than $449,000 | The FBI froze the account. The full amount was still there. |
| Missouri senior (2025) | Hijacked email thread | More than $1.3 million | The FBI froze the receiving account. |
| Bain v. Platinum Realty (2018) | Hijacked email thread | About $196,600 | A jury put 85% of the responsibility on the broker of the agent. |
| Choice Escrow v. BancorpSouth Bank | Hijacked email thread | $440,000 | The escrow company took the loss. The bank did not. |
From the U.S. Department of Justice, the FBI IC3 2025 report and court opinions
The Alabama and Texas cases show the scale. A single group can steal millions from many deals.
The U.S. Attorney in Texas said to confirm wire instructions in person or by phone. This is the rule that stops these attacks.
In August 2025, buyers got an email that pretended to come from their attorneys. They sent more than $449,000, and after they filed at IC3.gov the recipient bank put the full amount on hold.
In March 2025, a senior in Missouri got instructions from a compromised "title company" email for more than $1.3 million. The FBI froze the receiving account, which also held wires from other victims.
There is no single national answer. The loss depends on your state, the contracts, how the criminal got in and what each party did.
We found no settled rule for how courts divide losses between agents, title companies and clients. This section is not legal advice.
We could not extract the full text of the opinions. These descriptions come from secondary write-ups, so read the court opinion before you cite a case, for example the [Bain v.
Platinum Realty opinion](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-ksd-2_16-cv-02326/pdf/USCOURTS-ksd-2_16-cv-02326-2.pdf) on GovInfo.
A buyer lost about $196,600. Hacked emails gave fake wire instructions, and write-ups say the agent was the middleman between the title company and the buyer.
A jury put 85% of the responsibility on the broker of the agent. The judgment was about $167,100, and the court kept the verdict.
The write-ups disagree on the side of the agent and on any fault of the buyer. Do not state these two points as fact.
A hacked email of an escrow employee led to a fake $440,000 wire request. The company had refused an extra bank security procedure.
The escrow company took the loss, and the bank did not. The court found the bank security procedures commercially reasonable.
There are seven paths.
A call to a known number stops most of them.
It depends on the state, the contracts and how the criminal got in. There is no single rule.
In the best-known agent case, a Kansas federal jury in 2018 put 85% of the responsibility on the broker of an agent. In a different case, an escrow company took a $440,000 loss because it had refused extra bank security.
Ask your broker and an attorney about your case. Read the opinions before you use a summary.
Sometimes. Speed is the key factor.
Call the sending bank at once and ask for a recall. Then file at IC3.gov so that the FBI can ask the receiving bank to freeze the account.
If the money is still in the account, the bank can hold it. Recovery is not certain.
No. Tell clients to work with the title or escrow company and to check by phone.
In the best-known liability case, the agent was the middleman for the instructions. Litigators advise agents not to be the channel for wire details.
Say that wire details never change by email. Tell the client to call the title company on a number from the contract before the wire.
Say that this covers each wire in the deal, including earnest money, cash to close, payoff and seller proceeds. Give the warning at the start of the deal and again 2 days before closing.
You cannot stop each attack. You can make your deal the one where the attack fails.
Warn each client in writing. Never send wire instructions yourself.
Call a known number each time, and learn the first-hour steps.
What happened, what you noticed, what you’d do differently. We’ll read every one. Nothing is published with your name unless you say so.