Cybersecurity & data protectionUpdated 20 min read
Real estate cybersecurity means blocking eight attack paths, such as phishing, email takeover and wire fraud. Each path has measures and training that stop it.
Protect your email first, and call a known number before you accept new payment details.

Attackers reach real estate agents through a small number of paths. Each path has a defense.
This guide covers each path in turn. For each one, it gives the measures to put in place and the training to give yourself and your team.
After the strategies, you can read the FBI data and the real cases. They show that these attacks hit agents and title companies like yours.
These tips come from FBI, FTC, CISA and NIST guidance and from how real attacks work. Do the first three today.
A passkey cannot be typed into a fake sign-in page. This stops the most common way that criminals take over an inbox.
If your email has no passkey option, use an authenticator app. Do not use text codes for email.
Criminals often add a rule that copies your mail to their address. You can still sign in and see nothing wrong.
Open your email settings and look for "forwarding", "rules" and "filters". Delete each item that you did not make.
Take the phone number from the signed contract on the first day. Never take it from an email.
This one number helps stop wire fraud. A call to it takes less than a minute.
A criminal who controls a thread can answer your questions in it. A reply in the same thread proves nothing.
Use a phone call for each money question. Use a number that you already had.
Search your email for "license", "passport" and "bank statement". Move the files to your secure system and delete the attachments.
A criminal who gets into your inbox then finds less to steal.
Bookmark your MLS, e-sign tool and transaction system. A link in an email can lead to a fake page, and a bookmark cannot.
This also stops most phishing links that pretend to be your broker.
A criminal who takes over your phone number can read your text codes. A port-out PIN makes this much harder.
Set it now. It takes about 5 minutes.
Send the wire warning at the contract and again 2 days before closing.
Your email signature can say "Wire details never change by email. Call to check."
A credit freeze is free and does not change your credit score. You place it at each of the three credit bureaus.
It stops a criminal from opening new credit in your name. Tell clients about it after any breach.
Save your broker, your bank fraud line and the title company for each open deal. Add IC3.gov.
In a crisis, minutes matter. You must not search for these numbers.
Most attacks on agents are not clever hacks. A convincing message, a weak password or a trusted tool gives the attacker a way in.
These are the eight paths. The sections below cover each one.
A phishing email looks like it comes from your broker, MLS, e-sign tool or bank. It asks you to sign in or open a file.
The FTC lists these signs. They are a generic greeting, a billing problem, an unfamiliar invoice and a link to make a payment.
This email is not real, and each address uses a reserved example domain.
Tap the parts that look wrong. Then check your answers.
Two lines are fine.
Is this email from your broker real?
This email arrives in your inbox at 4:52 pm on a Friday. Tap each part that looks wrong. Then check your answers.
The FTC guidance gives the same signs. If you have an account with the company, call a phone number that you already know.
A criminal with your password reads your deals. The criminal often adds a hidden forwarding rule and then sends mail as you.
In a 2024 Texas case, the criminal read the email of real estate businesses to find large transactions. You can read the case below.
A criminal changes the bank details at closing. The email can come from the real account or from a lookalike address.
This is the costliest path. The average business email compromise loss was about $123,000 in 2025.
Our wire fraud guide has the full deal protocol, the scripts and the first-hour steps.
A criminal poses as the owner of a property, often vacant land, and uses a real agent to sell it. The FBI says criminals get owner data from county records, data brokers, stolen accounts and phishing.
The same data lets a criminal pose as your client. Our guide to seller impersonation fraud has the full playbook.
A password from a breached site often works on other sites. Criminals try stolen passwords on your CRM, e-sign tool and email.
This is credential stuffing.
Much password advice is old. NIST updated its guidance in 2025.
Old password habits and the current NIST guidance
From NIST SP 800-63B Revision 4 (August 2025).
| Old habit | What NIST now says |
|---|---|
| Change your password every 90 days | Services must not force regular changes. They must force a change if a password is compromised. |
| Add capitals, numbers and symbols | Services must not set composition rules. Length is more important. |
| 8 characters is enough | Use 15 characters or more if the password is the only factor. 8 is allowed as part of MFA. |
| Do not paste passwords | Services must allow password managers and autofill. |
| A password and a code are fully safe | Passwords are not phishing-resistant. A fake sign-in page can get them. |
From NIST SP 800-63B-4
This ranking is our judgment, based on how each method fails. CISA says to use phishing-resistant MFA where it is offered.
Criminals use texts that pretend to be a package, a showing or a locked account. They also call and pretend to be a client or a bank.
A SIM swap is a different attack. The criminal moves your phone number to another device and reads your text codes.
The new risk is a helpful assistant that you paste a contract into. "Shadow AI" is the use of AI tools that your brokerage did not approve.
Vendors are a risk too. In 2019 a flaw at a title company exposed more than 800 million document images, as you can read below.
Keep the threat in proportion. The FBI 2025 report counted AI references in 115 real estate fraud complaints, about 1% of the total.
Do not try to find AI. Check each fact against a second source.
A lost laptop, a shared family computer or an old attachment can expose client files. These are simple problems with simple fixes.
Measures work only if you keep them current. A short routine does this.
Tick what you already do. The chart shows where the gaps are.
Agent security self-check
Aim for 100% in each section. Your ticks stay in this browser.
Where you stand, by section
| Section | done |
|---|---|
| Email and logins | 0 of 4 |
| Phone and devices | 0 of 4 |
| Clients and money | 0 of 4 |
| AI and vendors | 0 of 3 |
If client data or your data is exposed, act fast and in order. Send affected clients to IdentityTheft.gov for a recovery plan.
The FTC says a credit freeze is free. It does not change your credit score, and you place it at each of the three credit bureaus.
The FBI collects crime reports from victims. Its group for this is the Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3).
In 2025, IC3 got 12,368 real estate fraud complaints. Victims lost $275,110,419.
Treat these numbers as a minimum. Wire theft at closing usually goes in a different group, business email compromise (BEC).
Real estate fraud losses reported to the FBI, by year
Millions of dollars. 2025 was the third-highest of the six years, after 2022 and 2021.
| Year | Losses ($M) |
|---|---|
| 2020 | 213.2 |
| 2021 | 350.3 |
| 2022 | 396.9 |
| 2023 | 145.2 |
| 2024 | 173.6 |
| 2025 | 275.1 |
Source: FBI IC3 annual reports, 2022 to 2025 (2020 and 2021 from the 2022 report)
Phishing and spoofing had the most complaints in 2025. The average loss was about $1,100.
The average BEC loss was about $123,000. A phishing email is the first step, and the costly scam comes after it.
Average reported loss per complaint, 2025
Total losses divided by the number of complaints for each crime type.
| Crime type | Average loss ($) |
|---|---|
| Phishing and spoofing | 1100 |
| Real estate fraud | 22200 |
| Business email compromise | 123000 |
Source: FBI IC3 2025 Internet Crime Report, calculated
Clients age 60 and over filed 20% of the real estate complaints in 2025. They lost 45% of the money.
The average loss for this group was about $50,000. For all other clients it was about $15,300.
CertifID is a company that sells wire checks. In its 2025 survey of about 1,500 buyers and sellers, one in four got a false or suspicious message during closing.
4.7% said they lost money. This is vendor data, not government data, so use it as an estimate.
How many of your clients will see a scam this year?
Move the slider to the number of buyers and sellers that you represent in a year. The tool multiplies it by published survey rates.
Likely to be targeted
5.3 to 6.2
Clients who get a suspicious or false message during the deal.
Likely to lose money
1.1
Clients who say they lost money. First-time buyers are about 3 times as likely.
In 5 years, this is about 26 to 31 clients who see a scam message.
Rates come from CertifID consumer surveys (22% to 26% targeted, 4.7% victims). Vendor data, so use it as an estimate
These cases show that the attacks in this guide are real. Each case has a source from a government agency or a court.
The first four cases hit the industry. The last four hit individuals and small firms.
Use the table to compare the cases. Filter by who was hit, or sort by year.
Real estate cyber cases at a glance
Eight cases from SEC filings, Department of Justice releases, the FBI 2025 report and court opinions.
| First American Financial | 2019 | Industry | More than 800 million document images exposed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fidelity National Financial | 2023 | Industry | Title, escrow and mortgage services disrupted |
| Alabama conspiracy | 2024 | Industry | More than 400 victims and $19.6 million lost by 231 of them |
| Texas phishing and spoofing | 2024 | Industry | About $12 million lost |
| Buyers and a fake attorney email | 2025 | Individual or small firm | More than $449,000 sent, and then frozen |
| Missouri senior | 2025 | Individual or small firm | More than $1.3 million in instructions, and the account was frozen |
| Bain v. Platinum Realty | 2018 | Individual or small firm | About $196,600 lost, with 85% of the fault on the broker |
| Choice Escrow v. BancorpSouth Bank | Not stated | Individual or small firm | $440,000 fake wire request |
From the SEC, the U.S. Department of Justice, FBI IC3 and court opinions
In May 2019, a journalist told First American about a flaw in its document-sharing application. The flaw exposed more than 800 million document images, some from 2003, with Social Security numbers and financial data.
The SEC says the security staff found the flaw months earlier and did not fix it. In June 2021, First American paid a $487,616 penalty.
Your takeaway. A flaw at a title partner exposes your clients.
Ask vendors and partners how they protect documents.
In November 2023, Fidelity National Financial told the SEC that an unauthorized party got into its systems and took credentials. The company blocked access to some systems to contain the incident.
This disrupted title insurance, escrow and mortgage services. Closings that depended on those services could slow down.
Your takeaway. Keep a phone number for your title officer, and keep copies of each contract outside one system.
In 2024, a federal court sentenced a man to 10 years for a business email compromise conspiracy. The criminals sent phishing emails with malicious links to title companies, real estate agents and real estate attorneys.
When an employee entered a login, the criminals read the mailbox and watched for a buyer payment. They then emailed wire instructions to the buyer.
More than 400 people were victims. 231 of them lost their entire transaction, for $19,599,969.46 in total.
Your takeaway. The criminals targeted agents by name.
Your inbox is a target.
In November 2024, a federal court in Texas sentenced a man to 316 months. He phished real estate businesses and read their email to find large transactions.
He changed the wire instructions and sent them again from spoofed addresses. The actual loss was about $12 million, and the court ordered $3,386,908 in restitution.
Your takeaway. The U.S.
Attorney said to confirm wire instructions in person or by phone. This is the rule that stops the attack.
In August 2025, buyers got an email that pretended to come from their attorneys. They sent more than $449,000 for a home closing.
They reported it to their bank, and the FBI froze the account at the recipient bank. The full amount was still there.
Your takeaway. A fast report can save a client's down payment.
In March 2025, a senior in Missouri got wire instructions from a compromised "title company" email. The instructions were for more than $1.3 million.
The FBI froze the receiving account. Wires from other victims were also in it.
Your takeaway. A compromised title company email can reach your client without any mistake by you.
In Bain v. Platinum Realty, a Kansas federal jury put 85% of the responsibility on the broker of an agent.
A buyer had lost about $196,600 after fake wire instructions passed through the agent.
This is described in secondary write-ups, so read the court opinion before you cite it. The case shows that an agent can face a loss claim.
Your takeaway. Do not forward or confirm wire instructions.
Warn clients in writing.
In Choice Escrow and Land Title v. BancorpSouth Bank, a hacked email of an escrow employee led to a fake $440,000 wire request.
The company had refused an extra bank security procedure.
The escrow company took the loss, and the bank did not. This is described in secondary write-ups.
Your takeaway. Turn on each security option that your bank and tools offer.
Turn on multi-factor authentication for your email. Your email resets the passwords for most other accounts.
Wire fraud also starts in email. It is the most valuable account to protect.
Yes. In a 2024 Alabama case, criminals sent phishing emails to title companies, real estate agents and real estate attorneys.
More than 400 people were victims, and 231 lost their entire transaction.
Do a short phishing test each month and a mailbox check each month. Review vendors, AI tools and insurance twice a year.
Train each new agent in the first week.
Yes to the manager. No to the schedule.
A manager makes a long, unique password for each account. NIST says services must not force regular changes, and CISA says to use at least 16 characters.
It is safe for public content, for example a listing description. Do not put client names, financials, contracts or IDs into an unapproved tool.
You cannot control where that data goes.
You do not need technical skill. Turn on MFA, use a password manager and call a known number for each money request.
Then build the routine of a few minutes each week and a short check each month. The real cases show that attackers target agents, and that a fast, prepared response saves money.
What happened, what you noticed, what you’d do differently. We’ll read every one. Nothing is published with your name unless you say so.